Asia Times
By Peter J Brown
In mid-April, two Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers, the Choukai and Suzunami, unexpectedly encountered several Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships, including a pair of submarines and eight destroyers, approximately 140 kilometers west-southwest of Okinawa near the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands.
The Chinese warships were heading out of the East China Sea and into the Western Pacific. They passed north of Miyako Island – the northernmost island in the Nansei group – through the
Miyako Strait and then proceeded to head southeast.
They were there to practice anti-submarine warfare, underway refueling and helicopter flight training, to name a few of the procedures.
During one PLAN helicopter flight, the Suzunami was subjected to a close encounter which prompted a formal protest by Japan’s SDF Joint Staff Office. The presence of the PLAN subs also sparked a protest.
Japan’s Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi was upset that so many Chinese warships had sailed so near to Japan on their way to the western Pacific Ocean without any prior notification by China. [1]
Kitazawa said nothing about whether or not any of the five new Chinese earth observation/military reconnaissance satellites launched since late 2009 were engaged in assisting the PLAN warships during their unannounced passage.
Gary Li, a PLA specialist at the London-based Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS) said the PLAN’s actions in this instance were very significant. Li describes the incident as unprecedented and an attempt by China to “send a very clear message to the region that it should be prepared to see a China unafraid to really test its reach and move into new areas”. [2]
Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC, did not agree with Li, adding that the recent PLAN “blue water” activity off Japan did not prove that the PLAN has entered a disturbing new phase in its development.
“Calling this a new phase is overly dramatic. The PLA has been working for a long time on expanding their ability to operate farther from their shores and conduct joint operations closely coordinating air, land and sea platforms,” said Thompson. “These PLAN exercises certainly demonstrate expanded capabilities, or at least the willingness to exercise the hardware they have more vigorously, but it should be viewed as part of a continuum rather than a departure from a previous period of development.”
Certainly, it is not getting any easier for the US and the rest of Asia to determine where exactly China is heading and what China’s exact intentions are.
“Reports of a transit by the PLAN forces close to Okinawa only remind US allies in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific, that China’s future course is unclear,” said Abraham Denmark, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC. “It is important to retain a military hedge against the possibility that China could become confrontational and militarily aggressive.”
The PLAN has long been charged with two primary tasks: defending the mainland and operations related to a Taiwan contingency, which would primarily involve anti-access/area denial operations in the Western Pacific, according to Denmark.
This exercise may be further evidence of the growing emphasis placed by the PLAN on protecting vital so-called “Sea Lines of Communication” (SLOCs). Chinese President Hu Jintao has referred to this role as one of the PLA’s “new historic missions”.
“China’s leaders have slowly come to recognize that its continued economic development relies on access to foreign resources and markets. For example, 80% of China’s oil imports flow through the Strait of Malacca, yet the PLAN currently does not have the capability to protect Chinese vessels far from home,” said Denmark. “This has made China’s military leaders begin to examine a third role for the PLAN, which would entail SLOC protection.”
Richard Fisher, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, described this recent East China Sea exercise by the PLAN as representing “a significant step in reaping the past decade’s investments”.
“The PLAN deployed at least two small multi-platform surface action groups to include submarines, long-range anti-air defenses, logistic support ships, supported by new long-range ground based and space-based surveillance, and reportedly, significant ground-based air,” said Fisher. “This was a multi-fleet operation that reportedly involved Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS] aircraft and fighters, which if true would constitute a major expansion of the PLAN’s operational capabilities.”
v For Taiwan and for any US forces that may have to break a future PLAN blockade, the message is clear.
“In a decade, there could be two carriers, larger destroyers, and, even ship- and submarine-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles [ASBMs] in the mix. Absent a sustained investment by the US and Japan in space defenses, naval energy weapons to counter ASBMs, plus their own, and, fifth and sixth generation fighters for air force and naval deployment, they will lose maritime dominance in the Western Pacific by the mid-2020s,” said Fisher. “These investments are less likely as long as Washington and Tokyo remain transfixed by the mirage that Beijing will become their ‘pivotal partner’ in meeting future challenges, they simply want to ignore the fact that it is China which is the challenge.”
As for the role of space assets and space defense-related issues, they have slipped under the radar in large part thus far. What is unfolding overhead in support of any or all of the PLAN operations may be the most significant aspect of this recent Chinese war gaming in the Western Pacific. In fact, absent evidence to the contrary, the presence aloft of so many new Chinese earth observation/military reconnaissance satellites is what sets this exercise apart from all previous PLAN exercises.
According to Associate Professor Andrew Erickson with the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, China is rapidly improving its increasingly diverse network of space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors in support of military land, sea and air operations.
“Synthetic Aperture Radar [SAR] in particular offers wide coverage at sufficient resolution. Maritime surveillance, prioritized at the national level under China’s 863 State High-Technology Development Plan, is receiving significant funding,” said Erickson.
Over the past decade, China has launched two Haiyang (Ocean) maritime observation satellites, and a third is now scheduled for launch this year after its original launch date in 2009 was scratched. In addition, China’s has recently expanded its fleet of Yaogan satellites, which China describes as merely engaging in civilian earth observation missions. However, many experts identify them as dual role, military reconnaissance satellites. The Yaogans carry a mix of optical as well as radar-based sensors.
“Of particular note are the five Yaogan satellites that China has launched in the past five months. Yaogan 7 and 8 were launched in December. Yaogan 7 is optical and Yaogan 8 appears to be equipped with SAR,” said Erickson. “Yaogan 9A, 9B, and 9C, launched in March, share the same orbit, suggesting that they have a special mission to perform.”
Interestingly, when the official announcement was made by China’s Xinhua news agency of the pending Yaogan 9 launch – a day before it took place as is the custom whenever secret Chinese military payloads in particular are ready to go up – Xinhua reported that a large satellite, and not a payload consisting of three smaller formation-flying satellites, was sitting on the launch pad. [3]
All of these Chinese satellites, together with China’s development of ground-based over-the-horizon radars, suggests that China is developing unprecedented capability to monitor and conduct operations along its disputed maritime periphery, according to Erickson. more …
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