All ‘AmeriChina’ cards on table
Asia Times
Jul 15, 2010
By Francesco Sisci
SINOGRAPH
BEIJING – There is no international political engagement more important than Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States at the end of November.
The trip should give new impetus to relations between today’s two major powers: China and America, or if you prefer a moniker for this exclusive group – AmeriChina, or even the Group of 2.
Between now and November, diplomats from both sides hope the two countries can overcome a series of complex problems to
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make the meeting a success. Bilateral relations nowadays are held hostage to several twisted military and strategic issues that are central – much more so than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – to global politics and future economics.
The bilateral military dialogue so far has stalled because Washington wants to talk without changing much of the present situation, while Beijing wants America to first resolve the issues of arms sales to Taiwan and US surveillance/spying missions around China.
America providing weapons to Taiwan has long been a thorn in Beijing’s side. Relations between Beijing and Taipei have improved markedly in recent years. The two parties established direct channels of communications
and transport (rather than going through Hong Kong) and signed a free-trade agreement in early July that effectively integrates the island’s economy with that of the continent. Reunification is a now only a political question, and a path that neither party is eager to hasten along.
The only potential stumbling block comes from Taiwan’s theoretical military strength (the island is independent de facto but not de jure), which can repel a theoretical attack from the mainland.
While the possibility of an attack is all very theoretical, it has very practical consequences: if Taipei has an army capable of defending the island, not only can Taiwan always resist the mainland’s siren song, it can also decide to suddenly declare formal independence.
This is the ideal platform for the Democratic Progressive Party, the opposition party in Taiwan, and it also provides significant political leverage against Beijing.
If Taiwan – like China, with a majority of ethnic Han – became formally independent, why should Xinjiang or Tibet remain part of China, since these regions have local populations that aren’t even Han? If Xinjiang and Tibet became independent, Beijing would lose about half its national territory.
In other words, the sale of American weapons to Taiwan supports the forces that want to dismantle parts of China.
On the other hand, America is obliged to sell those arms because of a law passed by the US Congress. And anyway, if America were to stop selling weapons to Taiwan, the American public might see this as if a timid US were handing over the Taiwan lamb to the China wolf.
In the past, the issue was on the backburner, but now it has become more urgent because Beijing is making a lot of progress with Taiwan and wants to close the arms issue to ensure the momentum is not put into reverse.
Furthermore, there is America’s surveillance on China. US ships and aircraft conduct about a thousand missions a year around China, including surveying the seabed (ie, preparing for possible attacks by submarines) and detecting the capacity of Chinese military technology
.
There have been incidents, such as last year and in 2001, and these could have turned into more significant clashes. more …







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